By Ronald E. Turner, Ph.D., Analytic Services Inc.
Published: May 6, 2015
“The Chinese space program is owned lock, stock and barrel by the People’s Liberation Army.… It’s really important that we keep the Red Chinese out of our space program.” So said Rep. John Culberson (R-Texas), the new Chairman of the subcommittee that funds NASA.
When asked in an unrelated event about the potential for NASA cooperation with China, NASA Administrator Charles Bolden said, “It probably won’t happen in my tenure as the NASA administrator, and I think that’s unfortunate.”
This paper explores the rationales behind the two divergent views on U.S.-China cooperation in space, and suggests that limited engagement with the Chinese, through NASA, would benefit the United States.
The United States today has the world’s premier space program. Both its military and civilian space programs lead the world in space technology, space applications, and space exploration.
The United States military relies heavily on space assets. Dedicated military space systems are an integral part of its military operations, supporting intelligence gathering, communication, navigation, environment monitoring, and more. In addition, the United States makes extensive use of civil and commercial space systems, particularly for communications, but also for weather and surveillance. The decision to integrate space into the U.S. military concept of operations came together successfully in the first Gulf War in 1991, to the degree that it is sometimes called the first space war.
The U.S. civilian space program has greater government funding than any other civil space program in the world. It has an active research program with robotic space missions exploring throughout the solar system. NASA’s human spaceflight program leads, with international partners, the International Space Station (ISS), the largest and most sophisticated space structure ever built. Over 215 individuals from 15 countries have been on the ISS. NASA is building and testing its next-generation human space vehicle, the Orion spacecraft, and the Space Launch System, which will have lift capability exceeding that of the Saturn V, which took humans to the Moon in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Despite its accomplishments and ongoing endeavors, the United States is perceived as losing its position of leadership in space exploration. This is due in large measure to the lack of a clear objective for its human space program. While the stated long-term goal of the U.S. space program is to put humans on Mars in the 2030s, there is no clear development path to achieve it. An effort to put humans back on the Moon, called for by President G. W. Bush, was canceled after President Obama took office, and NASA’s human spaceflight program was redirected toward Mars. But the path led first to visiting an asteroid, a mission that has failed to catch the public’s attention. In addition, the U.S. Space Shuttle program ended, leaving the United States with no launch system of its own to get astronauts to and from the ISS. The ISS lifetime has been extended to 2024, but it is not clear that it could or should be maintained beyond that.
Meanwhile, space enthusiasts perceive the Chinese space program as ascending. China sees the value of a strong space program both as a means to enhance its military effectiveness and as a way to show the world (and its own people) that it is the rightful heir to U.S. dominance in space.
China’s military, noting the success of space systems in the 1991 Gulf War, has been accelerating integration of space systems into its military doctrine and concepts of operation ever since. The Chinese have fielded space systems for intelligence gathering, environment monitoring, and communications. They are developing a navigation system that would compete with the U.S. Global Positioning System. The Chinese system is now regionally effective and expected to be available globally by 2020. The Chinese are developing a family of launch vehicles to provide routine access to space; some of them provide commercial launch services. This year the Chinese family of launch vehicles is expected to add a geosynchronous-capable vehicle equivalent to the U.S. Delta IV and the European Arianne V. Table 1 lists representative international launch vehicles and their development status.
Table 1: Selected international launch vehicles
The Chinese are also developing “counterspace” capability: the ability to destroy or render inoperative the space assets of opposing forces. The most prominent example of this was the destruction of one of their own retired weather satellites (Fengyun-1C) to test an antisatellite weapon in January 2007. That test by a kill-vehicle launched from the Earth to destroy the target spacecraft on orbit resulted in the largest single production of long-lived space debris. That was the only instance of a full kinetic kill test, but the Chinese continue to develop counterspace options, including co-orbital spacecraft that can rendezvous with target spacecraft and ways to blind or incapacitate satellites using lasers or other covert means.
On a more positive note, the Chinese are pursuing lunar and human spaceflight programs, replicating successes the United States and Russia achieved in the 1960s and 1970s (but no other country has achieved since). To be clear, these activities are under the umbrella of the Chinese military. But then again, most national space programs have a significant overlap between military and civil applications.
Figure 1 summarizes Chinese human space missions. Following a series of unoccupied test flights from 1999 to 2002, the first Chinese “taikonaut” (astronaut) was launched in 2003 on a mission that lasted just over 21 hours. Since then, there have been four successively more sophisticated missions, with crew sizes growing up to three and consisting of both male and female taikonauts.
Figure 1: Summary of Chinese human spaceflight accomplishments. Data compiled from various sources, graphic created by the author.
In September 2011, the Chinese launched a space station of sorts: The Tiangong-1 is slightly more massive than the Shenzhou spacecraft (both vehicles are around 8,000 kg). For comparison, the Soviet Salyut space stations, on orbit variously from 1971 to 1991, were around 20,000 kg. The Soviet/Russian Mir Space Station, on orbit from 1986 to 1996, was around 130,000 kg, while the completed International Space Station is around 420,000 kg.
Plans for a “Salyut-class” station, Tiangong-2, have slipped, but it may be launched as early as 2016. The Chinese have discussed plans for a larger (almost Mir-class) station to be assembled on orbit circa 2020.
In the very long term, the Chinese have announced interest in (but no firm plans for) a human base on the Moon. At the current rate of development, this would be no earlier than the late 2020s or early 2030s, a time frame consistent with projections of a heavy lift launch vehicle circa 2030.
The Chinese have expressed an interest in exploring the Moon, at least with robotic spacecraft (the “Chang’e” series). They sent orbiter missions to the Moon in 2007 and 2010. They landed a stationary base station with a roll-off rover on the Moon in December 2013. They have begun plans for a lunar sample return mission and made a test launch in October 2014. The actual sample return mission is planned for 2017 or 2018, with a potential follow-on mission in early 2020.
A summary of Chinese progress in human and robotic exploration was provided by Alanna Krolikowski in testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission:
The Chinese space establishment’s record of achievement includes remarkable feats of technology development, adaptation, and refinement, but it has yet to blaze trails toward original objectives and historical firsts in space.
In other words, the Chinese are about to complete the easy part of replicating U.S. and Soviet/Russian accomplishments, but in order to continue attracting attention and respect, they will have to stretch their goals. It remains to be seen whether this commitment will survive as investments for further achievement become more complex and expensive, particularly if the Chinese economy encounters a slowdown in the years to come.
One more piece of the puzzle often overlooked in discussions of U.S.-Chinese relations in space is the emergence of a highly visible, and progressively more capable and profitable, commercial space exploration community. With increasingly sophisticated commercial ventures expected over the next decade, there will be greater global access to advanced space technology, and the prestige value of national space programs will be muted.
Commercial space has been a mature and profitable enterprise for decades, starting with the commercialization of communications satellites with Telstar 1 in 1962, then branching out to include remote sensing. Direct service from satellite owners and operators is estimated at over $20 billion USD annually. Including the space manufacturing supply chain and other consumer services, the commercial space industry accounts for over $250 billion USD annually worldwide.
Building on expansions into remote sensing services, recently commercial companies have been moving into new areas that were formerly exclusive domains of national governments: most exciting to the public is the attempt to provide fully commercial human access to space (being marketed to space tourists and space scientists). Most visible of these are Virgin Galactic, offering suborbital visits to “near space,” and Bigelow Aerospace, which is working toward orbital space habitats. Bigelow, in particular, is working with SpaceX to secure commercial transportation to and from its habitats. Elon Musk, CEO of SpaceX, has made no secret of his desires to send a commercial human mission to Mars. While reaching out to Mars is still a dream, in spite of pronouncements to the contrary by Mars One, more realistic goals for human and scientific ventures are quite reasonable.
Robotic exploration may be a growth industry for private enterprise over the next decade. The advent of six-inch CubeSats has made spacecraft accessible to colleges and even high schools. On a bigger scale, it is likely that one or more teams will claim the $20 million Google Lunar XPrize to land a rover on the Moon, travel 500 meters, and send back a high-definition TV broadcast before December 31, 2016.
Since April 2011, NASA has been legally prohibited from any cooperative activities with China, at the insistence of Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Virginia) while he was Chairman of the subcommittee responsible for NASA funding. Rep. John Culberson (R-Texas) took over the role of Chairman after Wolf left Congress. Culberson has publicly stated his desire to continue the ban, which reads, in part:
None of the funds made available by this Act may be used for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) or the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company unless such activities are specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of enactment of this Act.
NASA solicitations allow foreign participation via non-U.S. organizations, subject to NASA’s policy of no exchange of funds, in which each government supports its own national participants and accounts for associated costs. Foreign nationals are permitted to support NASA research if they are legally employed by a U.S. organization and that organization follows U.S. export control restrictions. This allows, for example, foreign graduate students at a U.S. university to contribute to NASA space research activities.
However, the prohibition in place against China is significantly more restrictive, as stated in a NASA solicitation: “Proposals must not include bilateral participation, collaboration, or coordination with China or any Chinese-owned company or entity, whether funded or performed under a no-exchange-of funds arrangement.”
The reasons Rep. Wolf gave for imposing the restrictions on NASA, and the reasons Rep. Culberson gives for extending them, are straightforward and threefold:
-China is militarily a threat to the United States
China’s military is growing more sophisticated and is increasing its reliance on space assets as a force multiplier. In addition, it is developing counterspace weapons to deny potential adversaries access to their military space assets. Shutting down the flow of space technology is intended to increase the cost and limit the capability of Chinese military space systems.
-The United States has nothing to gain by cooperating with China
China’s civil space program is intended to be a source of pride for the Chinese people and evidence to the international community that China has emerged from its Third World, technologically stunted past. However, China is just now duplicating what other nations accomplished in the 1960s and 1970s. Limiting cooperation with China makes it difficult for the Chinese to innovate and make significant advances. Further, cooperation with China would be a one-way street: the Chinese would gain technology and stature, while the United States would give up its technical advantage and cede its leadership role. In addition, cooperation would increase China’s economic competitiveness to the detriment of the U.S. space industry.
-China’s government does not respect basic human rights for its people
China’s restrictive policies are severe and do not reflect Western values of human rights. Cooperation would imply tolerance of these policies.
Rationale for U.S.-China Cooperation
The rationale against cooperation seems at first glance to be compelling, but there are counterpoints to each of the rationales for not cooperating with China.
-China is militarily a threat to the United States
The Chinese military is indeed investing heavily in space-based systems. It certainly makes sense to carefully restrict access to technologies that would uniquely and substantially increase the capabilities of systems that pose a significant military threat, but excessive efforts to restrict all U.S. cooperation is not in the interests of the United States.
Denying the Chinese access to U.S. know-how will not reduce the threat of Chinese military space ventures: the Chinese will continue to acquire the necessary capabilities either from the international space community or by developing the capabilities themselves. (Note that most space technology applications are neutral to whether the application is overtly military or civilian.) This path has resulted in the expansive capability they have fielded over the past decade and the advances we anticipate in the decades ahead. Indeed, by developing their own space manufacturing infrastructure, the Chinese can become increasingly competitive in the world market.
China is increasingly cooperating with other nations, particularly Russia and European nations. This supports the technological advancements and economies of those countries, to the detriment of U.S. industry, which is hurt in two ways: it cannot compete for bilateral U.S.-Chinese opportunities, and its contributions to international missions are restricted if there is the possibility of Chinese participation in or access to those missions.
As the Chinese increase their reliance on space systems, they will be less inclined to employ counterspace attacks, thus reducing the Chinese threat to U.S. military space systems. Attacks that destroy all space systems (via orbital debris or other means) will also take out their own systems. The Chinese may be less inclined to develop more sophisticated counterspace methods, such as covert co-orbital intercept, since this could lead to a counterspace arms race, which, the Chinese recognize, the United States is in a better technological position to win.
-The United States has nothing to gain by cooperating with China
Chinese space technology certainly lags U.S. space technology. But extreme applications of restrictions hurt the U.S. space industry in dealings with the rest of the world. In addition, cooperation provides benefits beyond technological innovations. There are more scientific problems in the world than scientists available to address them. Most space science research programs today are international endeavors. U.S. space science missions typically include European, Japanese, or other nations’ instruments and collaborators, and similarly many, if not most, international research missions include U.S. instruments and collaborators. Chinese researchers, both indigenously trained and those who study abroad, could contribute significantly to a wide range of challenging problems (such as the underlying mechanisms responsible for global warming, a topic inherently global in scope and requiring data that can be obtained only from space). Similarly, simple space-based technological applications can improve quality of life around the world and do not require “rocket science” to accomplish—for example, increased maritime monitoring for search and rescue of ships (and aircraft) in distress. We should encourage Chinese cooperation in such endeavors.
-China’s government does not respect basic human rights for its people
The United States has a long history of engaging its enemies to pursue change. The most recent example is the about-face in the U.S. relationship with Cuba. Isolation complicates opportunities to have effective give-and-take dialogue.
Even when the broader posture is to restrict trade or other exchanges, at times the United States has made space or science an exception, thus opening doors to an adversary and providing valuable ways to learn more about how the other side perceives the United States and the motivations and actions it uses to counter the United States. A classic example is U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the 1970s, which gave the United States valuable insight into the tightly closed Soviet space industry. This cooperation during the Soviet era later opened the door to Russian cooperation, eventually enabling the United States to complete the ISS and giving the Russians access to a station after Mir was no longer available. More recently, when sanctions were imposed on Russia after it began supporting Ukrainian separatists, the restrictions did not include U.S.-Russian cooperation in the International Space Station, avoiding an interruption of ISS operations.
NASA-China Cooperation in Space
NASA Administrator Charles Bolden is no stranger to China and the Chinese space program. He went to China in November 2014 and, following an aviation conference there, “met with his Chinese counterparts.” Bolden had previously visited China as NASA Administrator in October 2010, prior to the Congressionally initiated ban, and he met again with Chinese space leaders at a conference in Washington, DC, in January 2014. Based on his responses to questions in various forums, he clearly seems to believe that limited cooperation between NASA and China could be in the best interest of the United States, and he is not alone in thinking this.
A National Academy of Sciences study charged with reviewing “the goals, core capabilities, and direction of human space flight” noted, “It is also evident that given the rapid development of China’s capabilities in space, it is in the best interests of the United States to be open to its inclusion in future international partnerships.”
One of the report’s principle recommendations stated (emphasis added):
Vigorously pursue opportunities for international and commercial collaboration in order to leverage financial resources and capabilities of other nations and commercial entities. International collaboration would be open to the inclusion of China and potentially other emerging space powers in addition to traditional international partners.
It further noted:
The prohibition of NASA’s speaking to Chinese space authorities has left open opportunities for collaboration that are being filled by other spacefaring nations.
Another relevant National Academy of Sciences activity is the Forum for New Leaders in Space Science which is a joint effort of the National Space Science Center of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Space Studies Board of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences’ National Research Council “designed to provide opportunities for a highly select group of young Earth and space scientists from China and the United States to discuss their research activities in an intimate and collegial environment.”
While this forum plans no formal report or set of recommendations, it was developed as a way to open the door to U.S.-Chinese cooperation in space research. There have been two meetings of the forum—in Beijing, China, and Irvine, California—attended by the same group of participants, largely representing space science and astrophysics. Additional meetings are planned. The goals of the forum:
-To identify and highlight the research achievements of the best and brightest young scientists currently working at the frontiers of space science
-To build informal bridges between the space-science communities in China and the United States
-To enhance the diffusion of insights gained from participation in the Forum to the larger space-science communities in China and the United States
Some comments relevant to NASA-China cooperation can be derived from testimony presented to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which was created by Congress in October 2000 to:
… monitor, investigate, and submit to Congress an annual report on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, and to provide recommendations, where appropriate, to Congress for legislative and administrative action. 
On February 18, 2015, the Commission held a hearing on China’s space and counterspace programs. Nine expert witnesses testified on the state of Chinese space capabilities, interpretations of Chinese intent, and perspectives for or against cooperation with China. Table 2 lists comments relevant specifically to the narrower issue of NASA cooperation with China’s space programs. (Note: The table should not be interpreted as a summary of the key points raised by the witnesses, as each had broader topics to address.)
Table 2: Excerpts from testimony to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “China’s Space and Counterspace Programs,” February 18, 2015, relevant to cooperation between the United States and China.
Excerpt relevant to cooperation between US (NASA) and China
Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation
“As the [People’s Liberation Army] continues its modernization program, it will likely continue to improve its ability to secure information dominance, including space dominance. At the same time, as technology improves, space operations themselves will shift from primarily oriented towards provision of information support towards combat capabilities to achieve space dominance.”
Roger Handberg, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Central Florida
“The ban on NASA interacting with China should be addressed so that more nuanced decisions can be made regarding what cooperation with China is deemed possible given security and economic concerns.”
Richard D. Fisher, Jr., Senior Fellow, Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment and Strategy Center
“Substantive cooperation with China in space offers no assurance that China will change its threatening behaviors on earth or in space but does create opportunities for China to exploit U.S. and Western space technology to gain potential military advantages.”
Joan Johnson-Freese, Professor, National Security Studies, U.S. Naval War College
“Cooperation with China in areas of shared interests is in the best interests of U.S. national security.”
Alanna Krolikowski, Princeton-Harvard China and the World Fellow, Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University
“Whether or not US policy has in fact had the hindering effects identified by Chinese experts, China has achieved an impressive record of national firsts in space technology while U.S. export controls have been in place. Further complicating the assessment is the fact that China’s high-technology industries have made significant advances both in areas that are tightly export-controlled, such as space technology, and in areas that are more loosely controlled, such as aeronautic technology.”
Tate Nurkin, Managing Director of Research and Thought Leadership, Jane’s IHS Aerospace, Defense and Security
“Engage China on space science, a relatively low risk area of engagement, that China’s Academy of Science has identified as an area of development.”
Kevin Pollpeter, Deputy Director, Study of Innovation and Technology in China, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California–San Diego
“Although China is probably truthful when it says that it is not in a space race, such statements mask the true intent of its space program: to become militarily, diplomatically, commercially, and economically as competitive as the United States is in space.”
Phillip Saunders, Distinguished Research Fellow and Director, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
“There are other areas such as many scientific applications and manned space flight where the United States can share information and experiences without compromising national security and can benefit from growing Chinese investments in space capabilities and China’s potential contributions to international space cooperation.”
Mark Stokes, Executive Director, Project 2049 Institute
People’s Liberation Army “operational requirements, technology development, and engineering [research and development] are also likely informed by intelligence collected through traditional clandestine human sources and signals intelligence (including cyber espionage).”
Four of the nine speakers were concerned that any cooperation would result in unacceptable technology transfer. However, another four advocated relaxing the restrictions on U.S.-China cooperation, at least in the areas of space research, believing that the U.S. benefit would outweigh the risks.
The United States is still the world’s preeminent spacefaring nation. Its military and civil space programs are the best-funded and most technologically advanced in the world. However, the rest of the world is catching up in most areas, and leads in some. Continued restriction of space technology exports in general, and to China specifically, has created economic incentives for other nations and private enterprises. The U.S. human space exploration program is widely seen as lacking vision and commitment, in spite of demonstrable progress via the ISS and development of a new heavy lift launch vehicle and a new deep-space spacecraft.
Meanwhile, the Chinese are developing space systems to support their military and as a means to show the world that they are an emerging technologically sophisticated world power. While they have yet to demonstrate any significant innovations in space, they have the resources and commitment to continue slowly progressing across the board in space capability. Further progress, particularly in human space exploration, may be hampered as the challenges become more expensive and complex.
The emerging commercialization of space exploration may mute the public relations value of a go-it-alone human space exploration program for any nation. The United States is encouraging this expansion by actively supporting commercial access of both crew and cargo to the ISS. It is possible, if not yet likely, that a future human habitat on the Moon may have a commercial venture logo, rather than any national flag.
While it is prudent to continue export control of leading-edge, militarily significant space technologies, it may be time to remove the comprehensive restrictions on NASA’s cooperation with China in space science and space exploration, which would open lines of communication to the Chinese space enterprise but would not require exchange of technologically sophisticated space hardware. Two specific near-term objectives should be considered:
Working with the Chinese is consistent with the U.S. position that space exploration belongs to the people of the world, not one country or another, particularly if this openness were extended to all emerging spacefaring nations. Truly ambitious human space exploration, such as a human mission to Mars, will be incredibly challenging and expensive, and may be possible only through international cooperation and significant and obvious U.S. leadership.
Ronald E. Turner is a Distinguished Analyst at Analytic Services Inc. The views expressed are soley the author's.
Image courtesy of HKmPUA via Flickr Creative Commons.
 Dan Leone, “NASA Spending Panel Chairman Keeps Focus on China,” Space News, February 25, 2015, reporting on the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee hearing, February 25, 2015, http://spacenews.com/nasa-spending-panel-chairman-keeps-focus-on-china/.
 Jeff Foust, “Review of Asteroid Redirect Mission Expected in the Next Month,” Space News, March 12, 2015, reporting on the American Astronautical Society’s Goddard Memorial Symposium, March 11, 2015, http://spacenews.com/review-of-asteroid-redirect-mission-expected-in-the-next-month/#sthash.BFyOh9hC.dpuf.
 The Space Economy at a Glance 2014, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Publishing, DOI:10.1787/9789264217294-en.
 National Research Council, Pathways to Exploration: Rationales and Approaches for a U.S. Program of Human Space Exploration (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2014).
 NASA Orbital Debris Quarterly News, vol. 11, issue 2, April 2007, http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv11i2.pdf.
 Ji Wu, Chinese Academy of Sciences, “China’s Activities in Solar and Space Physics,” presentation to the National Research Council Space Science Week Spring 2015 Meeting of the Committee on Solar and Space Physics, March 31–April 2, 2015, http://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/ssbsite/documents/webpage/ssb_160758.pdf.
 Alanna Krolikowski “Inputs into China’s Space Programs: Vision, Policy, and Organization,” testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing on “China’s Space and Counterspace Programs,” February 18, 2015, http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Krolikowski_Testimony.pdf.
 The Space Economy at a Glance 2014.
 Virgin Galactic, “Spaceline for Earth,” www.virgingalactic.com.
 Bigelow Aerospace, bigelowaerospace.com.
 Bigelow Aerospace, Strategic Relationships, SpaceX, http://bigelowaerospace.com/about/strategic-relationships/spacex/.
 “Colonizing Mars: The Future Belongs to SpaceX and Elon Musk,” May 15, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=P79E0-3LeW8.
 Mars One, “Human Settlement on Mars,” http://www.mars-one.com/.
 Google Lunar XPrize, Overview, http://lunar.xprize.org/about/overview.
 Public Law 112-55, 112th Congress.
 NASA Research Announcement NNH15ZOA001N, “Space Technology Research, Development, Demonstration, and Infusion-2015.”
 Jeff Foust, “NASA Administrator Visited China Last Month,” Space News, December 3, 2014, http://spacenews.com/42826nasa-administrator-visited-china-last-month/.
 “NASA Administrator Statement on China Visit,” NASA news release, October 25, 2010, http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2010/oct/HQ_10-270_Bolden_China.html.
 Frank Morring, Jr., “NASA, China Meet on Possible Cooperation,” Aviation Week, January 16, 2014, http://aviationweek.com/space/nasa-china-meet-possible-cooperation.
 National Research Council, Pathways to Exploration: Rationales and Approaches for a U.S. Program of Human Space Exploration.
 National Research Council, Pathways to Exploration: Rationales and Approaches for a U.S. Program of Human Space Exploration, p. 4.
 National Research Council, Pathways to Exploration: Rationales and Approaches for a U.S. Program of Human Space Exploration, p. 6.
 National Research Council, Pathways to Exploration: Rationales and Approaches for a U.S. Program of Human Space Exploration, p. 10.
 Forum for New Leaders in Space Science, National Academy of Sciences, Space Studies Board, http://sites.nationalacademies.org/SSB/SSB_086017.
 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “About Us,” http://www.uscc.gov/about.
 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Space and Counterspace Programs, February 18, 2015, http://www.uscc.gov/Hearings/hearing-china%E2%80%99s-space-and-counterspace-programs-webcast.